ded
that "if any cashier or other officer, agent or servant of
any incorporated bank shall embezzle or fraudulently convert
to his own use the property of the bank, he shall be punished,"
etc. It was earnestly contended that a president of a bank
was not an officer within the meaning of the statute; but
this contention was overruled by the presiding judge, who
was sustained in that view by the Supreme Court on exception.
There was, however, no such offence as embezzlement known
to the common law. So a person who fraudulently converted
to his own use the property of another could only be convicted
of larceny; and the offence of larceny could not be committed
where the offender had been entrusted with the possession
of the property converted, the essence of larceny being the
felonious taking of the property from the possession of the
owner. Further, nobody could be convicted of larceny except
on an indictment or complaint which set forth the time and
place of each single conversion. So, if a servant or agent
appropriated the fund of his principal, the embezzlement extending
over a long period of time, and it was not possible to set
forth or to prove the time, place, and circumstances of any
particular taking, the offender could not be convicted. The
statute to which I have just referred was intended to cure
both these difficulties; first, by making persons liable to
punishment who fraudulently appropriated the property of others,
notwithstanding they had come rightfully into possession; and
next, the necessity of setting forth the particular transaction
was obviated by an enactment that it should be enough to
prove the embezzlement of any sum of money within six months
of the time specified in the indictment.

After the conviction of Wyman, the case was carried to the
Supreme Court, which held that the statute making bank officers
liable included bank presidents. But the court held that
the other part of the statute, providing for the mode of
setting forth the offence in the indictment, did not apply to
bank officers; and that they could only be held on an indictment
which described the particular transaction, with time and
place. So the verdict of guilty against Wyman was set aside,
and a new trial ordered.

Before the new trial came on at Concord, a statute was passed
by the Legislature for the purpose of meeting this very case,
extending the provisions of the Revised Statutes as to the
mode of pleading in