of her missionaries
similarly useful as an excuse for the occupation of Kiao-Chao in
1897. No wonder the Chinese have grown cautious how they molest a
missionary; but they needed practical teaching before they learned
the lesson.
Unable to take a morsel of China as long as his powerful ally abstained
from territorial aggrandisement, Louis Napoleon subsequently employed
his troops to enlarge the borders of a small state which the French
claimed in Annam, laying the foundation of a dominion which goes
far to console them for the loss of India. America and Russia,
having no wrongs to redress, declined to send troops, but consented
to give moral support to a movement for placing foreign relations
with China on a satisfactory basis.
In the spring of 1858, the representatives of the four powers met
at the mouth of the Peiho, cooeperating in a loose sort of concert
which permitted each one to carryon negotiations on his own account.
As interpreter to the Hon. W. B. Reed, the American minister, I
enjoyed the best of opportunities for observing what went on behind
the scenes, besides being a spectator of more than one battle.
The neutrals, arriving in advance of the belligerents, opened
negotiations with the Viceroy of Chihli, which might have added
supplementary articles, but must have left the old treaties
substantially unchanged. The other envoys coming on the stage insisted
that the viceroy should wear the title and be clothed with the
powers of a plenipotentiary. When that was
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refused, as being "incompatible with the absolute sovereignty of
the Emperor," they stormed the forts and proceeded to Tientsin
where they were met by men whose credentials were made out in due
form, though it is doubtful if their powers exceeded those of the
crestfallen viceroy. A pitiful artifice to maintain their affectation
of superiority was the placing of the names of foreign countries
one space lower than that of China in the despatch announcing their
appointment. When this covert insult was pointed out they apologised
for a clerical error, and had the despatches rectified.
The allies were able to dictate their own terms; and they got all
they asked for, though, as will be seen, they did not ask enough.
The rest of us got the same, though we had struck no blow and shed
no blood. One article, known as "the most-favoured-nation clause"
(already in the treaty of 1844), was all that we required to enable
us to pick up the fru
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