they had built, and, moreover, a heavy battery
was established on the spurs of Hlangwani to drive them out of Colenso.
In the afternoon Hart's Brigade advanced from Chieveley, and his
leading-battalion, under Major Stuart-Wortley, occupied Colenso village
without any resistance.

The question now arose--Where should the river be crossed? Sir Redvers
Buller possessed the whole of the Hlangwani plateau, which, as the
reader may perceive by looking at the map opposite p. 448, fills up the
re-entrant angle made opposite Pieters by the Tugela after it leaves
Colenso. From this Hlangwani plateau he could either cross the river
where it ran north and south or where it ran east and west. Sir Redvers
Buller determined to cross the former reach beyond Colenso village. To
do this he had to let go his hold on the Monte Cristo ridge and resign
all the advantages which its possession had given him, and had besides
to descend into the low ground, where his army must be cramped between
the high hills on its left and the river on its right.

There was, of course, something to be said for the other plan, which was
advocated strongly by Sir Charles Warren. The crossing, it was urged,
was absolutely safe, being commanded on all sides by our guns, and the
enemy could make no opposition except with artillery. Moreover, the army
would get on its line of railway and could 'advance along the railroad.'
This last was a purely imaginary advantage, to be sure, because the
railway had no rolling-stock, and was disconnected from the rest of the
line by the destruction of the Tugela bridge. But what weighed with the
Commander-in-Chief much more than the representations of his lieutenant
was the accumulating evidence that the enemy were in full retreat. The
Intelligence reports all pointed to this situation. Boers had ridden off
in all directions. Waggons were seen trekking along every road to the
north and west. The camps between us and Ladysmith began to break up.
Everyone said, 'This is the result of Lord Roberts's advance: the Boers
find themselves now too weak to hold us off. They have raised the
siege.'

But this conclusion proved false in the sense that it was premature.
Undoubtedly the Boers had been reduced in strength by about 5,000 men,
who had been sent into the Free State for its defence. Until the Monte
Cristo ridge was lost to them they deemed themselves quite strong enough
to maintain the siege. When, however, this position was capt