by rebels or
invaders.

From every quarter came clamourings for troops. Soldiers were wanted
with vital need at Stormberg, at Rosmead Junction, at Colesberg, at De
Aar, but most of all they were wanted in Natal--Natal, which had been
promised protection 'with the whole force of the Empire,' and which was
already half overrun and the rest almost defenceless. So the army corps,
which was to have marched irresistibly to Bloemfontein and Pretoria, had
to be hurled into the country--each unit as it arrived--wherever the
need was greatest where all were great.

Sir Redvers Buller, thus assailed by the unforeseen and pressed on every
side, had to make up his mind quickly. He looked to Natal. It was there
that the fiercest fighting was in progress and that the strength and
vigour of the enemy was apparently most formidable. He had always
regarded the line of the Tugela as the only defensive line which British
forces would be strong enough to hold, and had recorded his opinion
against placing any troops north of that river.

In spite of this warning Ladysmith had been made a great military depot,
and had consequently come to be considered a place of primary
importance. It was again a question of balancing drawbacks. Buller
therefore telegraphed to White asking him whether he could entrench and
maintain himself pending the arrival of reinforcements. White replied
that he was prepared to make a prolonged defence of Ladysmith. To this
proposal the General-in-chief assented, observing only 'but the line of
the Tugela is very tempting.'

General Buller's plan now seems to have been briefly as follows: First,
to establish a _modus vivendi_ in the Cape Colony, with sufficient
troops to stand strictly on the defensive; secondly, to send a strong
force to Natal, and either restore the situation there, or, failing
that, extricate Sir George White so that his troops would be again
available for the defence of the Southern portion of the Colony;
thirdly, with what was left of the army corps--no longer strong enough
to invade the Free State--to relieve Kimberley; fourthly, after settling
Natal to return with such troops as could be spared and form with
reinforcements from home a fresh army to carry out the original scheme
of invading the Free State.

The defect in this plan was that there were not enough troops to carry
it out. As we had underestimated the offensive vigour which the enemy
was able to develop before the army could reach