belong to the present in a way in
which the older fountains of teaching do not; in the recognised teaching
of the Latin Church, they have taken their place and superseded them.

It was characteristic of Mr. Ward that his chief quarrel with the
Articles was not about the Sacraments, not about their language on
alleged Roman errors, but about the doctrine of grace, the relation of
the soul of man to the law, the forgiveness, the holiness of God,--the
doctrine, that is, in all its bearings, of justification. Mr. Newman had
examined this doctrine and the various language held about it with great
care, very firmly but very temperately, and had attempted to reconcile
with each other all but the extreme Lutheran statements. It was, he
said, among really religious men, a question of words. He had recognised
the faulty state of things in the pre-Reformation Church, the faulty
ideas about forgiveness, merit, grace, and works, from which the
Protestant language was a reaction, natural, if often excessive; and in
the English authoritative form of this language, he had found nothing
but what was perfectly capable of a sound and true meaning. From the
first, Mr. Ward's judgment was far more severe than this. To him, the
whole structure of the Articles on Justification and the doctrines
connected with it seemed based on the Lutheran theory, and for this
theory, as fundamentally and hopelessly immoral, he could not find words
sufficiently expressive of detestation and loathing. For the basis of
his own theory of religious knowledge was a moral basis; men came to the
knowledge of religious truth primarily not by the intellect, but by
absolute and unfailing loyalty to conscience and moral light; and a
doctrine which separated faith from morality and holiness, which made
man's highest good and his acceptance with God independent of what he
was as a moral agent, which relegated the realities of moral discipline
and goodness to a secondary and subordinate place,--as a mere sequel to
follow, almost mechanically and of course, on an act or feeling which
had nothing moral in it,--which substituted a fictitious and imputed
righteousness for an inherent and infused and real one, seemed to him
to confound the eternal foundations of right and wrong, and to be a
blasphemy against all that was true and sacred in religion.

Of the Lutheran doctrine[111] of justification, and the principle of
private judgment, I have argued that, in their abstract nat