h remains an immovable fact--the
party was incapable of providing adequate national defences against the
Germanic neighbour, while plans of reconquest can only be assigned to
the domain of myths.

On every occasion that the _revanche_ cry has been resuscitated, the
direct cause is to be sought in Germany. Having displaced France in 1870
from her position of the first military power in Europe, Germany has
endeavoured by fair and foul means to prevent her neighbour from again
raising her head, and that policy alone is to blame for the suspicion
and hatred which have marked Franco-German relations during the whole
period and plunged Europe into an era of armaments, ending in a world
war. England and Russia prevented Bismarck from annihilating France in
1875, an incident which aroused justified fear throughout France and
gave an impulse to the revenge party.

In 1881 the Iron Chancellor told the French Ambassador: "Outside Europe
you can do what you like." Bismarck's intention was to divert reviving
French energies to colonial work, and if possible involve her in
conflicts with the other Colonizing Powers. In both of these plans he
succeeded, but the common sense and loyalty of Great Britain and Italy
prevented the conflicts from assuming a dangerous form--war--as desired
by the Government in Berlin.

As soon as the latter perceived that French genius and persistency were
bearing fruit in a magnificent colonial empire, the innate jealousy and
greed of the German nation led to a policy of colonial pinpricks on the
part of the Kaiser's Government. This seems the most probable
explanation of Germany's attitude during the last decade before 1914.
The natural consequence was that those powers which had most to fear
through German ill-will were welded together more firmly in a policy of
self-protection.

Germany cannot, or will not, recognize that the causes of the
above-mentioned development are to be found solely and alone in her own
actions. On the contrary, she designates the "consequences" a world-wide
conspiracy against German interests. In naval affairs she adopts the
same naive line of argument. First and foremost Germany committed
herself to a policy of unlimited--even provocative--naval expansion.
When the Power most concerned--Great Britain--took precautionary
measures to guarantee British interests in view of Germany's "peaceful"
development, then the latter Power declared the consequences of her own
actions to b