thout ourselves determining or
promising any thing at all. Upon these accounts law is defined to be
"_a rule_."

MUNICIPAL law is also "a rule _of civil conduct_." This distinguishes
municipal law from the natural, or revealed; the former of which is
the rule of _moral_ conduct, and the latter not only the rule of moral
conduct, but also the rule of faith. These regard man as a creature,
and point out his duty to God, to himself, and to his neighbour,
considered in the light of an individual. But municipal or civil law
regards him also as a citizen, and bound to other duties towards his
neighbour, than those of mere nature and religion: duties, which he
has engaged in by enjoying the benefits of the common union; and which
amount to no more, than that he do contribute, on his part, to the
subsistence and peace of the society.

IT is likewise "a rule _prescribed_." Because a bare resolution,
confined in the breast of the legislator, without manifesting itself
by some external sign, can never be properly a law. It is requisite
that this resolution be notified to the people who are to obey it. But
the manner in which this notification is to be made, is matter of very
great indifference. It may be notified by universal tradition and long
practice, which supposes a previous publication, and is the case of
the common law of England. It may be notified, _viva voce_, by
officers appointed for that purpose, as is done with regard to
proclamations, and such acts of parliament as are appointed to be
publicly read in churches and other assemblies. It may lastly be
notified by writing, printing, or the like; which is the general
course taken with all our acts of parliament. Yet, whatever way is
made use of, it is incumbent on the promulgators to do it in the most
public and perspicuous manner; not like Caligula, who (according to
Dio Cassius) wrote his laws in a very small character, and hung them
up upon high pillars, the more effectually to ensnare the people.
There is still a more unreasonable method than this, which is called
making of laws _ex post facto_; when _after_ an action is committed,
the legislator then for the first time declares it to have been a
crime, and inflicts a punishment upon the person who has committed it;
here it is impossible that the party could foresee that an action,
innocent when it was done, should be afterwards converted to guilt by
a subsequent law; he had therefore no cause to abstain from it; a