nto the Po. He crossed this stream, and finding that he could not go
any further, on account of the torturing pain to which it put him to
be moved, he halted his army, marked out an encampment, threw up
fortifications around it, and prepared to make a stand. To his great
relief, Sempronius soon came up and joined him here.
There were now two generals. Napoleon used to say that one bad
commander was better than two good ones, so essential is it to success
in all military operations to secure that promptness, and confidence,
and decision which can only exist where action is directed by one
single mind. Sempronius and Scipio disagreed as to the proper course
to be pursued. Sempronius wished to attack Hannibal immediately.
Scipio was in favor of delay. Sempronius attributed Scipio's
reluctance to give battle to the dejection of mind and discouragement
produced by his wound, or to a feeling of envy lest he, Sempronius,
should have the honor of conquering the Carthaginians, while he
himself was helpless in his tent. On the other hand, Scipio thought
Sempronius inconsiderate and reckless, and disposed to rush heedlessly
into a contest with a foe whose powers and resources he did not
understand.
In the mean time, while the two commanders were thus divided in
opinion, some skirmishes and small engagements took place between
detachments from the two armies, in which Sempronius thought that the
Romans had the advantage. This excited his enthusiasm more and more,
and he became extremely desirous to bring on a general battle. He
began to be quite out of patience with Scipio's caution and delay. The
soldiers, he said, were full of strength and courage, all eager for
the combat, and it was absurd to hold them back on account of the
feebleness of one sick man. "Besides," said he, "of what use can it be
to delay any longer? We are as ready to meet the Carthaginians now as
we shall ever be. There is no _third_ consul to come and help us; and
what a disgrace it is for us Romans, who in the former war led our
troops to the very gates of Carthage, to allow Hannibal to bear sway
over all the north of Italy, while we retreat gradually before him,
afraid to encounter now a force that we have always conquered before."
Hannibal was not long in learning, through his spies, that there was
this difference of opinion between the Roman generals, and that
Sempronius was full of a presumptuous sort of ardor, and he began to
think that he could co
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