hant success, can
save him. There is somewhere in English history a story of a naval
commander, in the service of an English queen, who disobeyed the
orders of his superiors at one time, in a case of great emergency at
sea, and gained by so doing a very important victory. Immediately
afterward he placed himself under arrest, and went into port as a
prisoner accused of crime instead of a commander triumphing in his
victory. He surrendered himself to the queen's officers of justice,
and sent word to the queen herself that he knew very well that death
was the penalty for his offense, but that he was willing to sacrifice
his life _in any way_ in the service of her majesty. He was pardoned!

Nero, after much anxious deliberation, concluded that the emergency in
which he found himself placed was one requiring him to take the
responsibility of disobedience. He did not, however, dare to go
northward with all his forces, for that would be to leave southern
Italy wholly at the mercy of Hannibal. He selected, therefore, from
his whole force, which consisted of forty thousand men, seven or
eight thousand of the most efficient and trustworthy; the men on whom
he could most securely rely, both in respect to their ability to bear
the fatigues of a rapid march, and the courage and energy with which
they would meet Hasdrubal's forces in battle at the end of it. He was,
at the time when Hasdrubal's letters were intercepted, occupying a
spacious and well-situated camp. This he enlarged and strengthened, so
that Hannibal might not suspect that he intended any diminution of the
forces within. All this was done very promptly, so that, in a few
hours after he received the intelligence on which he was acting, he
was drawing off secretly, at night, a column of six or eight thousand
men, none of whom knew at all where they were going.

He proceeded as rapidly as possible to the northward, and, when he
arrived in the northern province, he contrived to get into the camp of
Livius as secretly as he had got out from his own. Thus, of the two
armies, the one where an accession of force was required was greatly
strengthened at the expense of the other, without either of the
Carthaginian generals having suspected the change.

Livius was rejoiced to get so opportune a re-enforcement. He
recommended that the troops should all remain quietly in camp for a
short time, until the newly-arrived troops could rest and recruit
themselves a little after their