and which every person ought to ponder carefully, is
the effect of the proposed 'cessation of hostilities' upon our neutral
neighbors. On this point the doctrine of international law is thus
stated by the distinguished French writer, Hautefeuille, 'the eminent
advocate of neutral rights,' as he is justly called by the American
editor of Wheaton, and whose works on neutral relations are always cited
with respect, and recognized as authority.

'The duties imposed on neutrals by the state of war belong
essentially to the state of war itself. From the moment it ceases,
for whatever cause, even temporarily, the duties of neutrals
likewise cease; _as to them, peace is completely restored during
the suspension of arms_. They resume then all the rights which had
been modified by the war, and can exercise them in their full
extent during the whole time fixed for the duration of the truce,
if this time has been limited by the agreement; and until the
resumption of hostilities has been officially announced to them, if
it has not been limited.'[5]

[Footnote 5: 'Des Droits des Nations Neutres,' t. I., p. 301]

Can language be clearer? It will not do to treat it lightly. It is a
statement of what international law is on this point from an authority;
and the reasons for the doctrine are clear and incontrovertible.
Neutrality depends on the fact of war; when, for any cause, that fact no
longer exists, neutrality ceases likewise, of course. It is only the
application of a well-known maxim of law, that when the reason of a rule
fails, the rule itself fails. Let there be 'a cessation of hostilities,'
then, as proposed in the Chicago platform, and how long would it be
before rebel ships of war from English ports would be ready to desolate
our coast, destroy our shipping, raise the blockade, and give to the
rebellion the aid and sustenance it must have ere long or perish?

There is still another difficulty in the way of suspending hostilities,
which it is well for us not to ignore. If we propose to the rebels 'a
cessation of hostilities,' does not the question immediately become one
of negotiation between separate Governments? Have we not in that moment,
and in that thing, then recognized the Southern Confederacy as a
separate and independent Power? For does not 'a cessation of
hostilities' presuppose parties of equal sovereignty on both sides?
Indeed, _The London Times_ of a recent date