versaries.
Are we in extremity, that this example of Napoleon should be suggested
in support of the Chicago platform?

As to how our overtures might be received at Richmond, we are no longer
left any excuse for doubting. The oft-repeated assurances of all who
have fled from the rebel tyranny since the war was begun, are, at
length, confirmed by the authoritative declaration of Jeff. Davis
himself. It is a declaration promulgated not only by Colonel Jaquess and
Mr. Gilmore, in the account given by the latter of their recent visit to
Richmond, but also by Mr. Benjamin, the rebel Secretary of State, in a
circular letter written for the purpose of giving the rebel account of
that visit. We are told by the rebel chief himself, that as _preliminary
to any negotiations, the independence of the Southern Confederacy must
be first acknowledged_. Why does not the Chicago platform suggest a way
of avoiding this difficulty? Why has it left the country in uncertainty
on a question so vital?

But, in the second place, suppose it were possible to have a 'cessation
of hostilities' without this preliminary acknowledgment of the
Confederate independence, and that the war might be at an absolute stand
still for a definite season, are we fully aware of the risks attending
this measure? For the Chicago platform has left them out of sight. 'A
cessation of hostilities' is an armistice; and there is no such thing
known in the authorities on international law, or in history, as 'a
cessation of hostilities' distinct from an armistice. In defining the
incidents of war, Wheaton speaks of a '_suspension of hostilities by
means of a truce_, or _armistice_,' and uses the three terms
interchangeably. In other words, whatever 'cessation (or suspension, as
it is called in the books) of hostilities,' there may occur between the
parties to a war, it is known among men and in history as an armistice,
which is also the technical term for it. There would be no need to
enlarge upon this point, if it had not been made already the basis of
fallacious appeals to popular ignorance. Now, the incidents of an
armistice are well defined, giving to both parties, besides the
advantage of time to rest, full liberty to repair damages and make up
losses of men and material; and it is perfect folly, or worse, to talk
of 'a cessation of hostilities' without giving to the rebels these
important advantages. But the controlling consideration in reference to
this whole thing,