the contrasts are instructive as to
its real nature.

The comparative psychology of peoples, studied from this point of view,
certainly does not include the whole of psychological science, which
requires other instruments and other modes of experience, but it is a
great help as a foundation. We believe that the study of myth, which
throws so much light on comparative psychology, is likewise of use for
the special psychology of man, since this can only arise from individual
and ethnical observation, and from experiment, dissociated from every
hindrance, and from metaphysical prejudice. And if by our humble essay
we can throw any light on this noble science, we shall be abundantly
rewarded.

CHAPTER II.

ANIMAL SENSATION AND PERCEPTION.

All animals communicate with each other and with the external world
through their senses, and by means of their perception, both internal
and external, they possess knowledge and apprehension of one another. In
the vast organic series of the animal kingdom, some are better provided
than others with methods, instruments, and apparatus fit for effecting
such communication. The senses of relation are not found in the same
degree in all animals, nor when such senses are the same in number are
they endowed with equal intensity, acuteness, and precision. But the
fundamental fact remains the same in all cases; they communicate with
themselves and with the external world through their senses.

We must now inquire what value the external object of perception,
considered in itself, has for the animal, what character it has and
assumes with respect to his inner sense in the act of perception or
apprehension. Man, and especially man in our days, after so many ages
of reflection, and through the influence of contemporary science, is so
far removed from the primitive and simple exercise of his psychical
life, that he finds it difficult to picture to himself the ancient and
spontaneous conditions under which his senses communicated with the
world and with himself. And therefore, without further consideration, he
thinks and believes that in primeval times everything took place in the
same way as it does at present, and, which is a still greater error, as
it takes place in the lower animals.

This identification of the complex machinery of human perception with
that of animals must not be regarded as an absurd paradox, since, as we
have shown in an earlier work, they were originally and in