act in the same
way, especially in the higher animals; and the origin, movements, and
associations of the imagination and the emotions are likewise identical.
Nor will it be disputed that we find in animals implicit memory,
judgment, and reasoning, the inductions and deductions from one special
fact to another, the passions, the physiological language of gestures,
expressive of internal emotions, and even, in the case of gregarious
animals, the combined action to effect certain purposes; so that, as far
as their higher orders are concerned, animals may be regarded as a
simple and undeveloped form of man, while man, by his later psychical
and organic evolution, has become a developed and complex animal.[4]
In my book on the fundamental law of intelligence in the animal kingdom,
I attempted to show this great truth, and to formulate a principle
common to all animals in the exercise of their psychical emotions, by
setting forth the essential elements as they are generally displayed. I
think I was not far from the truth in establishing a law which seems
indubitable; although, while some men whose opinion is worthy of esteem
have accepted it, other very competent judges have objected to some
parts of my theory, but without convincing me of error. I repeat my
conclusions here, since they are necessary to the theory of the genesis
of myth, which I propose to explain in this work. I hold the complete
identity between man and animals to be established by the adequate
consideration of the faculties, the psychical elements of consciousness
and intelligence, and the mode of their spontaneous exercise; and I
believe the superiority of man to consist not so much in new faculties
as in the reflex effect upon themselves of those he possesses in common
with the animals. The old adage confirms this theory: _Homo duplex_.
No one now doubts that animals feel, hear, remember, and the like, while
man is able to exercise his will, to feel, to remember, deliberately to
consider all his actions and functions, because he not only possesses
the direct and spontaneous intuition with respect to himself and things
in general which he has in common with animals, but he has an intuitive
knowledge of that intuition itself, and in this way he multiplies within
himself the exercise of his whole psychical life. We find the ultimate
cause of this return upon himself, and his intuition of things, in his
deliberate will, which does not only immediately com
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