against well-constructed and well-planned trenches, manned by a brave
and stubborn enemy, approximately their equal in numbers. They showed a
spirit of endurance and self-sacrifice of which their country may well
be proud.
But the repulse at Hanna did not discourage the British army. It was
decided to move up the left bank of the Tigris and attack the Turkish
position at the Dujailah redoubt. This meant a night march across the
desert with great danger that there would be no water supply and that,
unless the enemy was routed, the army would be in great danger.
General Lake says: "On the afternoon of March 7th, General Aylmer
assembled his subordinate commanders and gave his final instructions,
laying particular stress on the fact that the operation was designed to
effect a surprise, and that to prevent the enemy forestalling us, it was
essential that the first phase of the operation should be pushed through
with the utmost vigor. His dispositions were, briefly, as follows: The
greater part of a division under General Younghusband, assisted by naval
gunboats, controlled the enemy on the left bank. The remaining troops
were formed into two columns, under General Kemball and General Keary
respectively, a reserve of infantry, and the cavalry brigade, being held
at the Corps Commander's own disposal. Kemball's column covered on the
outer flank by the cavalry brigade was to make a turning movement to
attack the Dujailah redoubt from the south, supported by the remainder
of the force, operating from a position to the east of the redoubt. The
night march by this large force, which led across the enemy's front to a
position on his right flank, was a difficult operation, entailing
movement over unknown ground, and requiring most careful arrangement to
attain success."
Thanks to excellent staff work and good march discipline the troops
reached their allotted position apparently undiscovered by the enemy,
but while Keary's column was in position at daybreak, ready to support
Kemball's attack, the latter's command did not reach the point selected
for its deployment in the Dujailah depression until more than an hour
later. This delay was highly prejudicial to the success of the
operation.
When, nearly three hours later, Kemball's troops advanced to the attack,
they were strongly opposed by the enemy from trenches cleverly concealed
in the brushwood, and were unable to make further ground for some time,
though assisted by Kear
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