ion. In Gallipoli they had failed,
because at the very beginning they had not used their full strength.
Now, again, knowing as they did all that depended upon it, bound as they
were to the most loyal support of Serbia, the aid they sent was too
small to be more than a drop in the bucket. It must be remembered,
however, that the greatest leaders among the Allies were at all times
opposed to in any way scattering their strength. They believed that the
war was to be won in France. Military leaders in particular yielded
under protest to the political leaders when expeditions of this
character were undertaken.

Certainly this is true, that the world believed that Serbia had a right
to Allied assistance. The gallant little nation was fighting for her
life, and public honor demanded that she should be aided. It was this
strong feeling that led to the action that was taken, in spite of the
military opinions. It was, however, too late.

In the second week of October Serbia found herself faced by an enemy
which was attacking her on three sides. She herself had been greatly
weakened. Her losses in 1914, when she had driven Austria from her
border, must have been at least two hundred thousand men. She had
suffered from pestilence and famine. Her strength now could not have
been more than two hundred thousand, and though she was fairly well
supplied with munitions, she was so much outnumbered that she could
hardly hope for success. On her west she was facing the Austro-German
armies; on her east Bulgaria; on the south Albania. Her source of
supplies was Saloniki and this was really her only hope. If the Allies
at Saloniki could stop the Bulgarian movement, the Serbians might face
again the Austro-Germans. They expected this help from the Allies.

At Nish the town was decorated and the school children waited outside
the station with bouquets to present to the coming reinforcements. But
the Allies did not come.

Von Mackensen's plan was simple enough. His object was to win a way to
Constantinople. This could be done either by the control of the Danube
or the Ottoman Railroad. To control the Danube he had to seize
northeastern Serbia for the length of the river. This was comparatively
easy and would give him a clear water way to the Bulgarian railways
connected with Constantinople. The Ottoman railway was a harder route
to win. It meant an advance to the southeast, which would clear the
Moravo valley up to Nish, and then the Nishav