inseparable, such as corporeal quality,
and that in the middle of these nature subsists, which verges to the
inseparable, having a small representation of the separable and the
irrational soul, which verges to the separable; or it appears in a
certain respect to subsist by itself, separate from a subject; so that
it becomes doubtful whether it is self-motive, or alter-motive. For it
contains an abundant vestige of self-motion, but not that which is true
and converted to itself, and on this account perfectly separated from
a subject. And the vegetable soul has in a certain respect a middle
subsistence. On this account to some of the ancients it appeared to be
a certain soul, but to others, nature.
Again, therefore, that we may return to the proposed object of
investigation, how can a self-motive nature of this kind, which is
mingled with the alter-motive, be the first principle of things? For
it neither subsists from itself, nor does it in reality perfect itself;
but it requires a certain other nature, both for its subsistence and
perfection: and prior to it is that which is truly self-moved. Is
therefore that which is properly self-moved the principle, and is it
indigent of no form more excellent than itself? Or is not that which
moves always naturally prior to that which is moved; and in short does
not every form which is pure from its contrary subsist by itself prior
to that which is mingled with it? And is not the pure the cause of the
commingled? For that which is coessentialized with another has also an
energy mingled with that other. So that a self-moved nature will indeed,
make itself; but thus subsisting it will be at the same time moving and
moved, but will not be made a moving nature only. For neither is it this
alone. Every form however is always alone according to its first
subsistence; so that there will be that which moves only without being
moved. And indeed it would be absurd that there should be that which is
moved only such as body, but that prior both to that which is self-moved
and that which is moved only, there should not be that which moves only.
For it is evident that there must be, since this will be a more excellent
nature, and that which is self-moved, so far as it moves itself, is more
excellent than so far as it is moved. It is necessary therefore that the
essence which moves unmoved, should be first, as that which is moved, not
being motive, is the third, in the middle of which is the self-
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