the contrary, it was advisable to advance into the
inland country, the destruction of the fleet and magazines was the
only measure which could save that valuable prize from the hands of the
numerous and active troops which might suddenly be poured from the gates
of Ctesiphon. Had the arms of Julian been victorious, we should now
admire the conduct, as well as the courage, of a hero, who, by depriving
his soldiers of the hopes of a retreat, left them only the alternative
of death or conquest. [82]
[Footnote 77: The arts of this new Zopyrus (Greg. Nazianzen, Orat.
iv. p. 115, 116) may derive some credit from the testimony of two
abbreviators, (Sextus Rufus and Victor,) and the casual hints of
Libanius (Orat. Parent. c. 134, p. 357) and Ammianus, (xxiv. 7.) The
course of genuine history is interrupted by a most unseasonable chasm in
the text of Ammianus.]
[Footnote 78: See Ammianus, (xxiv. 7,) Libanius, (Orat. Parentalis, c.
132, 133, p. 356, 357,) Zosimus, (l. iii. p. 183,) Zonaras, (tom. ii.
l. xiii. p. 26) Gregory, (Orat. iv. p. 116,) and Augustin, (de Civitate
Dei, l. iv. c. 29, l. v. c. 21.) Of these Libanius alone attempts a
faint apology for his hero; who, according to Ammianus, pronounced his
own condemnation by a tardy and ineffectual attempt to extinguish the
flames.]
[Footnote 79: Consult Herodotus, (l. i. c. 194,) Strabo, (l. xvi. p.
1074,) and Tavernier, (part i. l. ii. p. 152.)]
[Footnote 80: A celeritate Tigris incipit vocari, ita appellant Medi
sagittam. Plin. Hist. Natur. vi. 31.]
[Footnote 81: One of these dikes, which produces an artificial cascade
or cataract, is described by Tavernier (part i. l. ii. p. 226) and
Thevenot, (part ii. l. i. p. 193.) The Persians, or Assyrians, labored
to interrupt the navigation of the river, (Strabo, l. xv. p. 1075.
D'Anville, l'Euphrate et le Tigre, p. 98, 99.)]
[Footnote 82: Recollect the successful and applauded rashness of
Agathocles and Cortez, who burnt their ships on the coast of Africa and
Mexico.]
The cumbersome train of artillery and wagons, which retards the
operations of a modern army, were in a great measure unknown in the
camps of the Romans. [83] Yet, in every age, the subsistence of sixty
thousand men must have been one of the most important cares of a prudent
general; and that subsistence could only be drawn from his own or from
the enemy's country. Had it been possible for Julian to maintain a
bridge of communication on the Tigris, and t
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