er are alike underived
and eternal, and God is the former of the universe in no other sense
than as he has been the necessary efficient cause, by which motion and
form have been impressed upon matter.

What notions the Stoics entertained of God sufficiently appears from
the single opinion of his finite nature; an opinion which necessarily
followed from the notion that he is only a part of a spherical, and
therefore a finite universe. On the doctrine of divine providence, which
was one of the chief points upon which the Stoics disputed with the
Epicureans, much is written, and with great strength and elegance, by
Seneca, Epictetus, and other later Stoics. But we are not to judge of
the genuine and original doctrine of this sect from the discourses of
writers who had probably corrupted their language on this subject, by
visiting the Christian school. The only way to form an accurate judgment
of their opinions concerning Providence, is to compare their popular
language upon this head with their general system, and explain the
former consistently with the fundamental principles of the latter.

If this be fairly done, it will appear that the agency of Deity is,
according to the Stoics, nothing more than the active motion of a
celestial ether, or fire, possessed of intelligence, which at first gave
form to the shapeless mass of gross matter, and being always essentially
united to the visible world by the same necessary agency, preserves its
order and harmony.

The Stoic idea of Providence is, not that of a being, wholly independent
of matter, freely directing and governing all things, but that of a
necessary chain of causes and effects, arising from the action of a
power, which is itself a part of the existence which it regulates, and
which equally with that existence is subject to the immutable law of
necessity. Providence, in the Stoic creed, is only another name for
absolute necessity, or fate, to which God and matter, or the universe,
which consists of both, is immutably subject. The rational, efficient,
and active principle in nature, the Stoics called by various names:
Nature, fate, Jupiter, God.

"What is nature," says Seneca, "but God; the divine reason, inherent in
the whole universe, and in all its parts? or you may call him, if you
please, the author of all things."

And again: "Whatever appellations imply celestial power and energy, may
be justly applied to God; his names may properly be as numerous as his
o