lterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a
miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument
from experience can possibly be imagined. Why is it more than probable
that all men must die; that lead cannot, of itself, remain suspended in
the air; that fire consumes wood, and is extinguished by water; unless
it be that these events are found agreeable to the laws of nature,
and there is required a violation of these laws, or, in other words,
a miracle to prevent them? Nothing is esteemed a miracle, if it ever
happen in the common course of nature. It is no miracle that a man,
seemingly in good health, should die on a sudden; because such a kind
of death, though more unusual than any other, has yet been frequently
observed to happen. But it is a miracle that a dead man should come to
life; because that has never been observed in any age or country. There
must, therefore, be an uniform experience against every miraculous
event, otherwise the event would not merit that appellation. And as an
uniform experience amounts to a proof, there is here a direct and
full proof, from the nature of the fact, against the existence of any
miracle; nor can such a proof be destroyed, or the miracle rendered
credible, but by an opposite proof which is superior. The plain
consequence is (and it is a general maxim worthy of our attention,)
'That no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the
testimony be of such a kind that its falsehood would be more miraculous
than the fact which it endeavors to establish. And even in that case
there is a mutual destruction of arguments, and the superior only gives
us an assurance suitable to that degree of force which remains after
deducting the inferior.' When any one tells me that he saw a dead man
restored to life, I immediately consider with myself whether it be more
probable that this person should either deceive or be deceived, or that
the fact which he relates should really have happened. I weigh the one
miracle against the other; and according to the superiority which
I discover, I pronounce my decision, and always reject the greater
miracle. If the falsehood of his testimony would be more miraculous than
the event which he relates; then, and not till then, can he pretend
to command my belief or opinion.... There is not to be found, in all
history, any miracle attested by a sufficient number of men, of such
unquestioned good sense, education