nother life, we think we are justified in giving
_precedence_ to the duties of this state, and of attaching _primary_
importance to the morality of man to man." It is not _certain_, then,
that there is no future life; it is even _possible_ that there may be
one; the supposition is not in itself incredible, it may even have
"testimony, conjecture, and probability" in its favor:--some attention
to it, therefore, cannot be forbidden without "committing the old sin
of dogmatism, and excluding the possibility of another world;" but its
comparative uncertainty is urged as a reason for "giving _precedence_ to
the duties of this state, and attaching _primary_ importance to the
morality of man to man." The question would seem to be, not whether
_any_ attention should be bestowed on a future life, but whether it
should be less or more than the attention which we bestow on the present
world. It is a question of degree; and the settlement of that question
is made to hinge entirely on the comparative uncertainty of our prospect
after death. Suppose it were more uncertain, might not the magnitude of
the interests that must be involved in a new and untried existence
hereafter, and which must be measured on the scale of eternity, be more
than sufficient to counterbalance the difference? "Let us be only fully
convinced that our present life is (or may be) the beginning of an
_eternal duration_, and how irresistibly are we urged to a mode of
conduct answerable to that _accession of importance_ which our present
condition in the world derives from the peculiar point of view in which
we then contemplate it!"[314] But, in point of fact, can it be
reasonably said that _the future of our present life_ is in any respect
more certain than our prospects after death: "What is our life? is it
not like a vapor, which appeareth for a little time, and then vanisheth
away?" And yet, in spite of its proverbial uncertainty, is it not a
fundamental principle of Secularism that "true life begins in
renunciation," and that "the _future_ must rule the _present_?" Extend
these maxims, which are of unquestionable authority with reference to
the present life, to our prospects beyond the grave, whether they be
regarded as certain, or probable, or possible only, and they will
abundantly vindicate the position that our conduct now and here should
be regulated to some extent by a regard to what may be before us. In
both cases alike, present gratification must give p