a," by
strategy alone.

As the enemy had retired, there was but one thing left to do,--go after
him and compel him to either fight or surrender, and this Rosecrans did
without a moment's delay.

As Chattanooga was abandoned, General Crittenden took possession without
serious opposition. The remainder of his troops were called up from the
river, and on the same day that the news of the evacuation was spread
around, he started with his corps for Ringgold, arriving at Rossville
that evening. On the same day, Negley marched to McLemore's Cove, a
split formed between Lookout Mountain and Pigeon Mountain, where he met
the enemy's outposts and drove them back for several miles. At the same
time Heg's brigade marched into Broomtown Valley, to support the
cavalry, should they be needed.

The pursuit was growing warm, and the next day the advance of the Union
troops was checked in several places and severe skirmishes resulted.
General Bragg had left Chattanooga in haste, but had no idea of
retreating without a battle. He reckoned that the Union forces were
larger in numbers than his own, and he devised a plan for meeting them
not as a whole but by columns.

The Confederate's first combination was directed against the corps under
General Thomas. If he could reach and crush Thomas's force before the
others could come up, he felt the remainder of the campaign would be
comparatively plain sailing. The division under Negley at McLemore's
Cove was not allowed to rest, for Bragg ordered a movement against it in
great force.

Had Bragg's orders been carried out, there is no doubt but that Negley's
division would have been overwhelmed by mere force of numbers if nothing
else. But fortunately for Thomas's corps there was a delay. Hill sent
word that the gaps were filled with felled timbers and could not be
cleared in twenty-four hours. Bragg then ordered Buckner forward to
cooperate with Hindman, but there was another fatal halt. To hasten this
battle Bragg then moved his headquarters to Lafayette, and ordered more
soldiers to this united attack, which was to fall on Negley, who was
isolated from the balance of the Fourteenth Army Corps by mountains hard
to travel.

All day long the Confederate commander listened for Hindman's proposed
attack, but it did not come, for Hindman thought the force before him
too strong and awaited reenforcements under Hill. In the meantime,
General Baird had come to Negley's support. There was some sha