or its defence the enemy
relied chiefly on fire from F13. After remaining in observation for a
considerable time the scouts crept carefully back, and the results of
their work were passed to the Brigade at 5 a.m. with our morning
progress report.

Later in the day we were asked to report to the Brigade in writing on
the enemy's trenches in front of our sector, as to the feasibility of
seizing F12. Our opinion was that there would be little difficulty in
rushing F12 without incurring serious casualties, but that to
consolidate and hold it under frontal and enfilade fire from F13 (in
which the enemy appeared to have machine-guns) and possibly also
enfilade fire from F12A, would be very costly. We suggested that before
any attempt on F12 should be made, at least the southern portion of F13
ought to be rendered untenable.

All forenoon rumours were floating about that arrangements were being
made for an attempt to retake the Vineyard by troops on our left.
Confirmation of these rumours came in the afternoon from the Brigade
Major when he telephoned to inform us that the attack was to be
delivered during the coming night, and asked us to send along, to
assist, a catapult which was in use in our F13 bomb station, and the
R.M.L.I. team, which had been left with us to work it. This was done,
though the special authority of the Naval Division had to be obtained
before the corporal of the R.M.L.I. party could be prevailed upon to
move his catapult and team from the spot where it had been posted by his
own C.O. In view of the possibility that the enemy might be tempted,
when he found the Vineyard attacked, to retaliate upon Argyle Street,
fifty of "D" Company slept in F12, ready to move immediately to the
assistance of the garrison of the new trench.

About 11 p.m. the Brigade gave us information as to the hour and other
particulars of the attack, and instructions that we were to assist the
attack by a heavy fire demonstration at 2.31 a.m. against the trenches
on our front, and that if the C.O. considered the conditions justified
it, we were to push forward and secure F12. The Brigadier agreed with
our views put forward in our report, and impressed upon the C.O. that he
did not expect him to attempt this unless an unexpected favourable
opportunity presented itself, but that in any case patrols might find
out more about F12. Patrols were accordingly warned to be in readiness
and, in the orders issued as to the fire demonstration