r ranks, eleven killed and thirty-six
wounded.

The West Attack was commanded by Major Neilson. G11A was known usually
to be unoccupied by the enemy at least by day, but the main central
communication trench running back from G11A to G12C was known to be held
by the Turks at various points, and it appeared to be very much a
question of time whether they or the attacking party could first reach
the junction of this trench with G11A. The attack too was obviously
handicapped in this race by the fact that it must be initiated from the
mouth of a tunnel, entrance to which was difficult and from which it
would be necessary to emerge into the nullah man by man. Time was bound
to be lost in hastily assembling each party at the mouth of the tunnel
and getting it started on its mission, while to rush men forward
individually as they left the tunnel would inevitably result in
confusion, disorganisation and possible disaster. Instructions were
therefore that each party was to assemble in the nullah and move as
quickly as possible on its objective as soon as it was complete.

[Illustration: SKETCH TO ILLUSTRATED POSITION ON NIGHTS 19/20 DECEMBER
1915.

POSITION OF EXPLODED MINES INDICATED BY CIRCLES.

a, b, c, d, e, f, g, DENOTE OBJECTIVES OF GRENADE PARTIES. e, f, g, IN
EAST ATTACK WERE ESTABLISHED a, b, c, d, IN WEST ATTACK WERE NOT
ESTABLISHED THE BARRICADES ERECTED BEING NAMED No. 6 and No.
6a.]

"C" Company was employed in this attack with grenade teams from other
companies of the battalion to make it up to the necessary number of
parties, while each had a definite object as in the east attack. At 2.15
p.m., simultaneously with the mine which was exploded at point E,
another mine was exploded in the cliff of Krithia nullah some yards
north of the tunnel. A few minutes after this explosion one of the
grenade parties, whose objective was the main central communication
trench, had got clear of the tunnel, assembled and was moving up the
slope outside the west parapet of G11A. It was closely followed by two
other parties, all three being clear of the nullah five minutes after
the exploding of the mine. These parties, which were moving along in
front of G11A, came under heavy rifle-fire and had to drop into the
trench. The overhead traverses, which were in a state of disrepair owing
to the trench being unoccupied by the enemy, were low and made progress
difficult and slow. Lieut. Aitken, who was leading the first grenade
team