refore hatred should be reckoned
one of the capital sins.

Obj. 3: Further, vice is a moral evil. Now hatred regards evil more
than any other passion does. Therefore it seems that hatred should be
reckoned a capital sin.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. xxxi) does not reckon hatred among
the seven capital sins.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 84, AA. 3, 4), a capital
vice is one from which other vices arise most frequently. Now vice is
contrary to man's nature, in as much as he is a rational animal: and
when a thing acts contrary to its nature, that which is natural to it
is corrupted little by little. Consequently it must first of all fail
in that which is less in accordance with its nature, and last of all
in that which is most in accordance with its nature, since what is
first in construction is last in destruction. Now that which, first
and foremost, is most natural to man, is the love of what is good,
and especially love of the Divine good, and of his neighbor's good.
Wherefore hatred, which is opposed to this love, is not the first but
the last thing in the downfall of virtue resulting from vice: and
therefore it is not a capital vice.

Reply Obj. 1: As stated in _Phys._ vii, text. 18, "the virtue of
a thing consists in its being well disposed in accordance with its
nature." Hence what is first and foremost in the virtues must be first
and foremost in the natural order. Hence charity is reckoned the
foremost of the virtues, and for the same reason hatred cannot be
first among the vices, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 2: Hatred of the evil that is contrary to one's
natural good, is the first of the soul's passions, even as love of
one's natural good is. But hatred of one's connatural good cannot be
first, but is something last, because such like hatred is a proof of
an already corrupted nature, even as love of an extraneous good.

Reply Obj. 3: Evil is twofold. One is a true evil, for the reason
that it is incompatible with one's natural good, and the hatred of
such an evil may have priority over the other passions. There is,
however, another which is not a true, but an apparent evil, which,
namely, is a true and connatural good, and yet is reckoned evil on
account of the corruption of nature: and the hatred of such an evil
must needs come last. This hatred is vicious, but the former is not.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 34, Art. 6]

Whether Hatred Arises from Envy?

Ob