ing, for then prophecy would not be about contingencies.
Therefore it is untrue that the matter of prophecy cannot be false.

_On the contrary,_ Cassiodorus says [*Prol. in Psalt. i] that
"prophecy is a Divine inspiration or revelation, announcing the issue
of things with invariable truth." Now the truth of prophecy would not
be invariable, if its matter could be false. Therefore nothing false
can come under prophecy.

_I answer that,_ As may be gathered from what has been said (AA. 1,
3, 5), prophecy is a kind of knowledge impressed under the form of
teaching on the prophet's intellect, by Divine revelation. Now the
truth of knowledge is the same in disciple and teacher since the
knowledge of the disciple is a likeness of the knowledge of the
teacher, even as in natural things the form of the thing generated is
a likeness of the form of the generator. Jerome speaks in this sense
when he says [*Comment. in Daniel ii, 10] that "prophecy is the seal
of the Divine foreknowledge." Consequently the same truth must needs
be in prophetic knowledge and utterances, as in the Divine knowledge,
under which nothing false can possibly come, as stated in the First
Part (Q. 16, A. 8). Therefore nothing false can come under prophecy.

Reply Obj. 1: As stated in the First Part (Q. 14, A. 13) the
certitude of the Divine foreknowledge does not exclude the
contingency of future singular events, because that knowledge regards
the future as present and already determinate to one thing. Wherefore
prophecy also, which is an "impressed likeness" or "seal of the
Divine foreknowledge," does not by its unchangeable truth exclude the
contingency of future things.

Reply Obj. 2: The Divine foreknowledge regards future things in two
ways. First, as they are in themselves, in so far, to wit, as it sees
them in their presentiality: secondly, as in their causes, inasmuch
as it sees the order of causes in relation to their effects. And
though future contingencies, considered as in themselves, are
determinate to one thing, yet, considered as in their causes, they
are not so determined but that they can happen otherwise. Again,
though this twofold knowledge is always united in the Divine
intellect, it is not always united in the prophetic revelation,
because an imprint made by an active cause is not always on a par
with the virtue of that cause. Hence sometimes the prophetic
revelation is an imprinted likeness of the Divine foreknowledge, in
so far as