phetic certitude, for this instinct is something
imperfect in the genus of prophecy. It is thus that we are to
understand the saying of Gregory. Lest, however, this should lead to
error, "they are very soon set aright by the Holy Ghost [*For
instance, cf. 2 Kings 7:3 seqq.], and from Him they hear the truth,
so that they reproach themselves for having said what was untrue," as
Gregory adds (Hom. i super Ezech.).

The arguments set down in the first place consider the revelation
that is made by the prophetic spirit; wherefore the answer to all the
objections is clear.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 171, Art. 6]

Whether Things Known or Declared Prophetically Can Be False?

Objection 1: It would seem that things known or declared
prophetically can be false. For prophecy is about future
contingencies, as stated above (A. 3). Now future contingencies may
possibly not happen; else they would happen of necessity. Therefore
the matter of prophecy can be false.

Obj. 2: Further, Isaias prophesied to Ezechias saying (Isa. 38:1):
"Take order with thy house, for thou shalt surely die, and shalt not
live," and yet fifteen years were added to his life (4 Kings 20:6).
Again the Lord said (Jer. 18:7, 8): "I will suddenly speak against a
nation and against a kingdom, to root out and to pull down and to
destroy it. If that nation against which I have spoken shall repent
of their evil, I also will repent of the evil that I have thought to
do them." This is instanced in the example of the Ninevites,
according to John 3:10: "The Lord [Vulg.: 'God'] had mercy with
regard to the evil which He had said that He would do to them, and He
did it not." Therefore the matter of prophecy can be false.

Obj. 3: Further, in a conditional proposition, whenever the
antecedent is absolutely necessary, the consequent is absolutely
necessary, because the consequent of a conditional proposition stands
in the same relation to the antecedent, as the conclusion to the
premises in a syllogism, and a syllogism whose premises are necessary
always leads to a necessary conclusion, as we find proved in I
Poster. 6. But if the matter of a prophecy cannot be false, the
following conditional proposition must needs be true: "If a thing has
been prophesied, it will be." Now the antecedent of this conditional
proposition is absolutely necessary, since it is about the past.
Therefore the consequent is also necessary absolutely; yet this is
unfitt