tuous without prudence, for Gregory says (Moral. ii, 46)
that "the other virtues cannot be virtues at all unless they effect
prudently what they desire to accomplish." Therefore all who have
grace have prudence.

_I answer that,_ The virtues must needs be connected together, so that
whoever has one has all, as stated above (I-II, Q. 65, A. 1). Now
whoever has grace has charity, so that he must needs have all the
other virtues, and hence, since prudence is a virtue, as shown above
(A. 4), he must, of necessity, have prudence also.

Reply Obj. 1: Diligence is twofold: one is merely sufficient
with regard to things necessary for salvation; and such diligence is
given to all who have grace, whom "His unction teacheth of all things"
(1 John 2:27). There is also another diligence which is more than
sufficient, whereby a man is able to make provision both for himself
and for others, not only in matters necessary for salvation, but also
in all things relating to human life; and such diligence as this is
not in all who have grace.

Reply Obj. 2: Those who require to be guided by the counsel of
others, are able, if they have grace, to take counsel for themselves
in this point at least, that they require the counsel of others and
can discern good from evil counsel.

Reply Obj. 3: Acquired prudence is caused by the exercise of
acts, wherefore "its acquisition demands experience and time" (Ethic.
ii, 1), hence it cannot be in the young, neither in habit nor in act.
On the other hand gratuitous prudence is caused by divine infusion.
Wherefore, in children who have been baptized but have not come to the
use of reason, there is prudence as to habit but not as to act, even
as in idiots; whereas in those who have come to the use of reason, it
is also as to act, with regard to things necessary for salvation. This
by practice merits increase, until it becomes perfect, even as the
other virtues. Hence the Apostle says (Heb. 5:14) that "strong meat is
for the perfect, for them who by custom have their senses exercised to
the discerning of good and evil."
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FIFTEENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 47, Art. 15]

Whether Prudence Is in Us by Nature?

Objection 1: It would seem that prudence is in us by nature. The
Philosopher says that things connected with prudence "seem to be
natural," namely "synesis, gnome" [*_synesis_ and _gnome_, Cf. I-II,
Q. 57, A. 6] and the like, but not those which are connected with
speculative