fies them. They will continue to accuse us of doing,
until we cease saying.

I am also aware they have not as yet in terms demanded the overthrow of
our Free-State constitutions. Yet those constitutions declare the
wrong of slavery with more solemn emphasis than do all other sayings
against it; and when all these other sayings shall have been silenced,
the overthrow of these constitutions will be demanded, and nothing be
left to resist the demand. It is nothing to the contrary that they do
not demand the whole of this just now. Demanding what they do, and for
the reason they do, they can voluntarily stop nowhere short of this
consummation. Holding, as they do, that slavery is morally right and
socially elevating, they cannot cease to demand a full national
recognition of it as a legal right and a social blessing.

Nor can we justifiably withhold this on any ground save our conviction
that slavery is wrong. If slavery is right, all words, acts, laws, and
constitutions against it are themselves wrong, and should be silenced
and swept away. If it is right, we cannot justly object to its
nationality--its universality; if it is wrong, they cannot justly
insist upon its extension--its enlargement. All they ask we could
readily grant, if we thought slavery right; all we ask they could as
readily grant, if they thought it wrong. Their thinking it right and
our thinking it wrong is the precise fact upon which depends the whole
controversy. Thinking it right, as they do, they are not to blame for
desiring its full recognition as being right; but thinking it wrong, as
we do, can we yield to them? Can we cast our votes with their view,
and against our own? In view of our moral, social, and political
responsibilities, can we do this?

Wrong as we think slavery is, we can yet afford to let it alone where
it is, because that much is due to the necessity arising from its
actual presence in the nation; but can we, while our votes will prevent
it, allow it to spread into the national Territories, and to overrun us
here in these free States? If our sense of duty forbids this, then let
us stand by our duty fearlessly and effectively. Let us be diverted by
none of those sophistical contrivances wherewith we are so
industriously plied and belabored--contrivances such as groping for
some middle ground between the right and the wrong: vain as the search
for a man who should be neither a living man nor a dead man; such as a
pol