ately
represented the tragedy of jealousy clearly recognized that it is either
atavistic or pathological; Shakespeare made his Othello a barbarian, and
Tolstoy made the Pozdnischeff of his _Kreutzer Sonata_ a lunatic. It is an
anti-social emotion, though it has been maintained by some that it has
been the cause of chastity and fidelity. Gesell, for instance, while
admitting its anti-social character and accumulating quotations in
evidence of the torture and disaster it occasions, seems to think that it
still ought to be encouraged in order to foster sexual virtues. Very
decided opinions have been expressed in the opposite sense. Jealousy, like
other shadows, says Ellen Key, belongs only to the dawn and the setting of
love, and a man should feel that it is a miracle, and not his right, if
the sun stands still at the zenith.[416]
Even therefore if jealousy has been a beneficial influence at the
beginning of civilization, as well as among animals,--as may probably be
admitted, though on the whole it seems rather to be the by-product of a
beneficial influence than such an influence itself,--it is still by no
means clear that it therefore becomes a desirable emotion in more advanced
stages of civilization. There are many primitive emotions, like anger and
fear, which we do not think it desirable to encourage in complex civilized
societies but rather seek to restrain and control, and even if we are
inclined to attribute an original value to jealousy, it seems to be among
these emotions that it ought to be placed.
Miss Clapperton, in discussing this problem (_Scientific
Meliorism_, pp. 129-137), follows Darwin (_Descent of Man_, Part
I, Ch. IV) in thinking that jealousy led to "the inculcation of
female virtue," but she adds that it has also been a cause of
woman's subjection, and now needs to be eliminated. "To rid
ourselves as rapidly as may be of jealousy is essential;
otherwise the great movement in favor of equality of sex will
necessarily meet with checks and grave obstruction."
Ribot (_La Logique des Sentiments_, pp. 75 et seq.; _Essai sur
les Passions_, pp. 91, 175), while stating that subjectively the
estimate of jealousy must differ in accordance with the ideal of
life held, considers that objectively we must incline to an
unfavorable estimate "Even a brief passion is a rupture in the
normal life; it is an abnormal, if not a pathological state, an
excr
|