sthenes considered it necessary to land about 10,000 soldiers of
different descriptions, although the Lacedaemonian force consisted of
only about 420 men. But this small force for a long while kept their
assailants at bay; till some Messenians, stealing round by the
sea-shore, over crags and cliffs which the Lacedaemonians had deemed
impracticable, suddenly appeared on the high ground which overhung
their rear. They now began to give way, and would soon have been all
slain; but Cleon and Demosthenes, being anxious to carry them prisoners
to Athens, sent a herald to summon them to surrender. The latter, in
token of compliance, dropped their shields, and waved their hands above
their heads. They requested, however, permission to communicate with
their countrymen on the mainland; who, after two or three
communications, sent them a final message--"to take counsel for
themselves, but to do nothing disgraceful." The survivors then
surrendered. They were 292 in number, 120 of whom were native Spartans
belonging to the first families. By this surrender the prestige of the
Spartan arms was in a great degree destroyed. The Spartans were not,
indeed, deemed invincible; but their previous feats, especially at
Thermopylae, had inspired the notion that they would rather die than
yield; an opinion which could now no longer be entertained.

Cleon had thus performed his promise. On the day after the victory he
and Demosthenes started with the prisoners for Athens, where they
arrived within 20 days from the time of Cleon's departure. Altogether,
this affair was one of the most favourable for the Athenians that had
occurred during the war. The prisoners would serve not only for a
guarantee against future invasions, which might be averted by
threatening to put them to death, but also as a means for extorting
advantageous conditions whenever a peace should be concluded. Nay, the
victory itself was of considerable importance, since it enabled the
Athenians to place Pylus in a better posture of defence, and, by
garrisoning it with Messenians from Naupactus, to create a stronghold
whence Laconia might be overrun and ravaged at pleasure. The
Lacedaemonians themselves were so sensible of these things, that they
sent repeated messages to Athens to propose a peace, but which the
Athenians altogether disregarded.

The eighth year of the war (B.C. 424) opened with brilliant prospects
for the Athenians. Elate with their continued good fo