e pivot upon which its unity and future co-operation
naturally and properly turns; that the Sovereign is the one possible
central figure of allegiance for all its scattered countries and
world-wide races; that without the Crown as the symbol of union and the
King as the living object of allegiance and personal sentiment the
British realms would be a series of separated units.

These facts lend additional importance to the character and history of
the Monarchy; to the influences which have controlled the life and
labours of King Edward; to the abilities which have marked his career
and the elements which have entered into the making of his character. He
may not in succeeding years of his reign have declared war like an
Edward I., or made secret diplomatic arrangements like a Charles II. He
may not have manipulated foreign combinations like a William III., or
dismissed his Ministers at pleasure like a George III., or worked one
faction in his Kingdom against another like a Charles I. None of these
things have been attempted, nor will his successor desire to undertake
them. But none the less there lay in his hand a vast and growing
power--the personal influence wielded by a popular and experienced
Monarch over his Ministry, his Court, his Diplomatic Staff throughout
the world, and his high officers in the Army and Navy. The prestige of
his personal honours or personal wishes and the known Imperialism of his
personal opinions must have had great weight in controlling Colonial
policy in London; while his experience of European and Eastern
statecraft through many years of close intercourse with foreign and home
statesmen undoubtedly had a marvelous effect in the control of British
policy abroad.

To the external Empire, as constituted at the beginning of the twentieth
century, the Crown is a many-sided factor. The personal and diplomatic
influence of the Sovereign is obvious and was illustrated by Queen
Victoria in such historic incidents as the personal relations with King
Louis Philippe which probably averted a war with France in the early
forties; in the later friendship with Louis Napoleon which helped to
make the Crimean War alliance possible; in the refusal by the Queen to
assent to a certain _casus belli_ despatch during the American War which
saved Great Britain from being drawn into the struggle; in her influence
upon the Cabinet in connection with the Schleswig-Holstein question,
which was exerted to such an extent