ministry, but not a
responsible ministry. It was manifestly impossible that each member of
the Legislative Council and Assembly should be consulted as to every
minute detail of the administration. Such a system would be cumbrous,
and altogether impracticable. The actual task of carrying on the
Government was therefore, as in England, entrusted to a small body of
men who, from the nature of their functions, were known as the Executive
Council. The members of this body were appointed by the Crown--that is
to say, by the Lieutenant-Governor--at will. It was not necessary that
they should have seats in either branch of the Legislature, to neither
of which were they in any sense responsible. They were not required to
possess any property or other qualification. In a word, the Crown's
representative was at liberty to select them without any restriction,
and no one in the Province would have had any constitutional right to
call him to account if he had seen fit to enrol his own valet as an
Executive Councillor. As matter of fact they were commonly selected from
the judiciary and other salaried officials, and from the members of the
Legislative Council. Their number was indeterminate, but was seldom less
than four or more than six, in addition to the Lieutenant-Governor
himself. Their functions consisted of giving advice to the
Lieutenant-Governor on all matters of governmental policy, whenever he
might deem it expedient to consult them. With respect to mere matters of
detail, such as appointments to office, he was not supposed to be under
the necessity of advising with them, nor, according to an opinion long
and ostentatiously proclaimed, was he in these early days under the
smallest obligation to follow their advice after it had been given.
This, however, was merely the prescriptive view, and it derived no
sanction from the Constitutional Act itself, which incidentally refers
to the Executive Council as being appointed "within such Province, for
the affairs thereof." On the other hand, the Executive Councillors
themselves were not legally or constitutionally responsible to the Upper
Canadian people, either individually or collectively, for any line of
policy they might inculcate, or for any advice they might give. There
were no means whereby they could be called to account by the people,
even should they corruptly and openly abuse the trust reposed in them.

It is not difficult to foresee the result of so anomalous a state of