applied by the judges?

Of course the first principle has been that all the working people
should get what is called a "minimum" or a "living" wage, but our
authors show that merely to keep their heads above the sea of pauperism
was not at all the goal of the workers of New Zealand. No doubt they
were already getting such a wage in that relatively new and prosperous
country, yet this was all the new law did or could offer, besides
keeping existing wage scales up to the rising cost of living. Anything
more would have required, not compulsory arbitration, but a series of
revolutionary changes in the whole economic and political structure.
"Another stumbling block in the way of advance in wages is the
inefficient or marginal or no-profit employer, who, hanging on the
ragged edge of ruin, opposes the raising of wages on the ground that the
slightest concession would plunge him into bankruptcy. His protests have
their effect on the Arbitration Court, which tries to do justice to all
the parties and fears to make any change for fear of hurting somebody.
But the organized workers, caring nothing for the interests of any
particular employer, demand improved conditions of labor, though the
inefficient employer be eliminated and all production be carried on by a
few capable employers doing business on a large scale and able to pay
the highest wages."

Here is the essential flaw in compulsory arbitration in competitive
industries (its limitations under monopolies will be mentioned later).
The courts cannot apply a different standard to different employers. On
the other hand, they cannot fix a wage which any employer cannot afford
to pay or which will drive him out of business. That is to say, the
standard tends to be fixed by what the poorest employer can pay, the
employer who, from the standpoint either of capital or of labor or of
efficient industry, really deserves to be driven from business. An
exception is made only against such employers as cannot even afford to
pay a _living_ wage--these alone are eliminated.

Le Rossignol and Stewart show that in view of these considerations the
court has repeatedly stated that "profit sharing could not be taken as a
basis of awards, on the ground that it would involve the necessity of
fixing differential rates of wages, which would lead to confusion, would
be unfair to many employers, and unsatisfactory to the workers
themselves."

With such a principle guiding the court, and it is p