ssassination at Sarajevo had sent a convulsive shudder throughout
the Balkans. The reason lay in the century-old antagonism between the
Slav and the Teuton. Serbia, Montenegro and Russia had never forgiven
Austria for seizing Bosnia and Herzegovina and making these Slavic
people subjects of the Austrian crown. Bulgaria, Roumania and Turkey
remained cold at the news of the assassination. German diplomacy was in
the ascendant at these courts and the prospect of war with Germany as
their great ally presented no terrors for them. The sympathies of the
people of Greece were with Serbia, but the Grecian Court, because the
Queen of Greece was the only sister of the German Kaiser, was whole
heartedly with Austria. Perhaps at the first the Roumanians were most
nearly neutral. They believed strongly that each of the small nations of
the Balkan region as well as all of the small nations that had been
absorbed but had not been digested by Austria, should cut itself from
the leading strings held by the large European powers. There was a
distinct undercurrent, for a federation resembling that of the United
States of America between these peoples. This was expressed most clearly
by M. Jonesco, leader of the Liberal party of Roumania and generally
recognized as the ablest statesman of middle Europe. He declared:

"I always believed, and still believe, that the Balkan States cannot
secure their future otherwise than by a close understanding among
themselves, whether this understanding shall or shall not take the form
of a federation. No one of the Balkan States is strong enough to resist
the pressure from one or another of the European powers.

"For this reason I am deeply grieved to see in the Balkan coalition of
1912 Roumania not invited. If Roumania had taken part in the first one,
we should not have had the second. I did all that was in my power and
succeeded in preventing the war between Roumania and the Balkan League
in the winter of 1912-13.

"I risked my popularity, and I do not feel sorry for it. I employed all
my efforts to prevent the second Balkan war, which, as is well known,
was profitable to us. I repeatedly told the Bulgarians that they ought
not to enter it because in that case we would enter it too. But I was
not successful in my efforts.

"During the second Balkan war I did all in my power to end it as quickly
as possible. At the conference at Bucharest I made efforts, as Mr.
Pashich and Mr. Venizelos know very wel