efend themselves.
It has utterly failed in this respect. The Allies are amply supplied
with food, and there are provisions enough on hand now, if every ship
should be sunk, to last the Allies and armies for months. The destroyer
is the ship which has brought Germany to her knees in submarine warfare
and will keep her there. We have not enough destroyers, and it is for
this reason we are obliged in this great transportation problem to run
risks which would not be taken under ordinary conditions. If every ship
was escorted by a sufficient number of destroyers I doubt if there would
be a single ship of any consequence sunk, except by the merest accident.

Upon the same subject, Sir Eric Geddes, First Lord of the British
Admiralty, on October 14th, reviewing the British effort in the war said
that during 1918 the casualties of the British on the western front
equaled those of all the Allies combined. The British navy, he said,
since the beginning of the war had lost in fighting ships of all classes
a total of 230, more than twice the losses in war vessels of all the
Allies.

In addition to these, Great Britain had lost 450 auxiliary craft, such
as mine-sweepers and trawlers, making a total of 680. He revealed the
fact that the effective warship barrage, which had been drawn between
the Orkneys and Norway against German submarines and surface craft, was,
during the later months of the war, maintained largely by ships of the
United States.

The British merchant ships lost since 1914 exceeded 2,400, representing
a gross tonnage of 7,750,000, nearly three times the aggregate loss of
all other allied and neutral countries.

In his statement on the submarine situation he said:

In February, 1917, the ruthless submarine warfare confronted us, whilst
the armies in France at that time were feeling a sense of superiority
over the enemy which was illustrated by the successes of the battle of
Arras, the taking of Vimy Ridge, the advance between the Ancre and the
Somme, the offensive in Champagne, Chemin des Dames, Messines and
Passchendaele Ridges. Thus we felt, and rightly felt, that the weakest
front at that time was the sea--not on the surface, but under water.

The whole of the available energies of the Allies were consequently
thrown into overcoming the submarine and the menace which threatened to
destroy the lines of communication of the Alliance. The reduced sinkings
which have been published since that period show how