or compelled
to surrender at discretion.

I could not deny (though I did not say so) that he had good grounds for
this opinion. The only hope for Mejia was that, alarmed by our
disappearance, he had stationed outposts on the heights and a line of
vedettes on the San Felipe road, and fortified the entrance to the
_quebrada_. In that case the attack might be repulsed, despite the
superiority of the Spanish infantry and the disadvantages of Mejia's
position. But the probabilities were against his having taken any of these
precautions; the last thing he thought of was being attacked, and I could
hardly doubt that he would be fatally entangled in the toils which were
being laid for him.

While these thoughts were passing through my mind we were marching rapidly
and silently toward our destination, lighted only by the stars. The force
consisted of two brigades, the second of which, commanded by General
Estero, had gone on half an hour previously. I was with the first and rode
with Griscelli's staff. So far there had not been the slightest hitch, and
the Spaniards promised themselves an easy victory.

It had been arranged that the first brigade should wait, about a mile from
the entrance to the valley until Estero opened fire, and then advance and
occupy the outlet. Therefore, when we reached the point in question a halt
was called, and we all listened eagerly for the preconcerted signal.

And then occurred one of those accidents which so often mar the best laid
plans. After we had waited a full hour, and just as day began to break,
the rattle of musketry was heard on the heights, whereupon Griscelli,
keenly alive to the fact that every moment of delay impaired his chances
of success, ordered his men to fall in and march at the double. But,
unfortunately for the Spaniards, the shots we had heard were fired too
soon. The way through the woods was long and difficult, Estero's men got
out of hand; some of them, in their excitement, fired too soon, with the
result that, when the first division appeared in the valley, the patriots,
rudely awakened from their fancied security, were getting under arms, and
Mejia saw at a glance into what a terrible predicament his overconfidence
had led him. He saw also (for though an indifferent general he was no
fool) that the only way of saving his army from destruction, was to break
out of the valley at all hazards, before the Spaniards enclosed him in a
ring of fire.

Mejia took his measure