not said, six-and-twenty years before, and
enforced, three years before; and it is almost verbally identical
with the view of uniformitarianism taken by Whewell, sixteen years
before, in a work with which, one would think, that any one who
undertakes to discuss the philosophy of science should be familiar.
Thirty years have elapsed since the beginner of 1856 persuaded himself
that he enlightened the foremost geologist of his time, and one of the
most acute and far-seeing men of science of any time, as to the scope
of the doctrines which the veteran philosopher had grown gray in
promulgating; and the Duke of Argyll's acquaintance with the
literature of geology has not, even now, become sufficiently profound
to dissipate that pleasant delusion.
If the Duke of Argyll's guidance in that branch of physical science,
with which alone he has given evidence of any practical acquaintance,
is thus unsafe, I may breathe more freely in setting my opinion
against the authoritative deliverances of his Grace about matters
which lie outside the province of geology.
And here the Duke's paper offers me such a wealth of opportunities
that choice becomes embarrassing. I must bear in mind the good old
adage, "Non multa sed multum." Tempting as it would be to follow the
Duke through his labyrinthine misunderstandings of the ordinary
terminology of philosophy and to comment on the curious
unintelligibility which hangs about his frequent outpourings of
fervid language, limits of space oblige me to restrict myself to those
points, the discussion of which may help to enlighten the public in
respect of matters of more importance than the competence of my Mentor
for the task which he has undertaken.
I am not sure when the employment of the word Law, in the sense in
which we speak of laws of nature, commenced, but examples of it may be
found in the works of Bacon, Descartes, and Spinoza. Bacon employs
"Law" as the equivalent of "Form," and I am inclined to think that he
may be responsible for a good deal of the confusion that has
subsequently arisen; but I am not aware that the term is used by other
authorities, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, in any other
sense than that of "rule" or "definite order" of the coexistence of
things or succession of events in nature. Descartes speaks of "regles,
que je nomme les lois de la nature." Leibnitz says "loi ou regle
generale," as if he considered the terms interchangeable.
The Duke of
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