essity for
commercial opulence and intellectual exertion. It may expose nations
more to each other's attacks; but it will render hostility more
dreaded, because more dangerous. On the whole, like the use of
gunpowder, which made a Tartar war impossible, and which rapidly
tended to civilize Europe, steam appears to be intended as a further
step in the same high process, in which force is to be put down by
intelligence, and success, even in war, is to depend on the industry
of peace; thus, in fact, providing a perpetual restriction on the
belligerent propensities of nations, and urging the uncivilized, by
necessity, to own the superiority, and follow the example of the
civilized, by knowledge, habit, and principle.

It is not to be forgotten, even in this general and brief view of the
values of the British fleet, that it has, within these few years,
assumed a new character as an instrument of war. The Syrian campaign,
the shortest, and, beyond all comparison, the most brilliant on
record, if we are to estimate military distinction, not only by the
gallantry of the conflict, but by the results of the victory--this
campaign, which at once finished the war in Syria, gave peace to
Turkey, reduced Egypt to obedience, rescued the sultan from Russian
influence, and Egypt from French; or rather rescued all Europe from
the collision of England, France, and Russia; and even, by the
evidence of our naval capabilities, taught American faction the wisdom
of avoiding hostilities--this grand operation was effected by a small
portion of the British navy, well commanded, directed to the right
point, and acting with national energy. The three hours' cannonade of
Acre, the most effective achievement in the annals of war, exhibited a
new use of a ship's broadside; for, though ships' guns had often
battered forts before, it was the first instance of a _fleet_ employed
in attack, and fully overpowering all opposition. The attack on
Algiers was the only exploit of a similar kind; but its success was
limited, and the result was so far disastrous, that it at once fixed
the eye of France on the invasion of Algiers, and disabled and
disheartened the native government from vigorous resistance. The
victory of the fleet at Acre will also have the effect of changing the
whole system of defence in fortresses and cities exposed to the sea.

But a still further advance in the employment of fleets as an
instrument of hostilities, has since occurred in th