on was
right in his belief that in this business there was as much to be feared
from the impetuous turbulence of the backwoodsmen as from the hostility
of the Spaniards.

Wrath over Jay's Negotiations.

The news of Jay's attempted negotiations with Gardoqui, distorted and
twisted, arrived right on top of these troubles, and threw the already
excited backwoods men into a frenzy. There was never any real danger
that Jay's proposition would be adopted; but the Westerners did not know
this. In all the considerable settlements on the western waters,
committees of correspondence were elected to remonstrate and petition
Congress against any agreement to close the Mississippi. [Footnote:
Madison MSS. Letter of Caleb Wallace, Nov. 12, 1787.] Even those who had
no sympathy with the separatist movement warned Congress that if any
such agreement were entered into it would probably entail the loss of
the western country. [Footnote: State Dept. MSS., No. 56. Symmes to the
President of Congress, May 3, 1787.]

Inconsistencies of the Frontiersmen.

There was justification for the original excitement; there was none
whatever for its continuance after Jay's final report to Congress, in
April, 1787, [Footnote: W. H. Trescott, "Diplomatic History of the
Administrations of Washington and Adams," p. 46.] and after the
publication by Congress of its resolve never to abandon its claim to the
Mississippi. Jay in this report took what was unquestionably the
rational position. He urged that the United States was undoubtedly in
the right; and that it should either insist upon a treaty with Spain, by
which all conflicting claims would be reconciled, or else simply claim
the right, and if Spain refused to grant it promptly declare war.

So far he was emphatically right. His cool and steadfast insistence on
our rights, and his clearsighted recognition of the proper way to obtain
them, contrasted well with the mixed turbulence and foolishness of the
Westerners who denounced him. They refused to give up the Mississippi;
and yet they also refused to support the party to which Jay belonged,
and therefore refused to establish a government strong enough to obtain
their rights by open force.

But Jay erred when he added, as he did, that there was no middle course
possible; that we must either treat or make war. It was undoubtedly to
our discredit, and to our temporary harm, that we refused to follow
either course; it showed the existence of v