ived of the truth, as Plato
says; but the falsity seemed to him to be true. Well, in acts what have
we of the like kind as we have here truth or falsehood? We have the fit
and the not fit (duty and not duty), the profitable and the
unprofitable, that which is suitable to a person and that which is not,
and whatever is like these. Can then a man think that a thing is useful
to him and not choose it? He cannot. How says Medea?

"'Tis true I know what evil I shall do,
But passion overpowers the better counsel."

She thought that to indulge her passion and take vengeance on her
husband was more profitable than to spare her children. It was so; but
she was deceived. Show her plainly that she is deceived, and she will
not do it; but so long as you do not show it, what can she follow except
that which appears to herself (her opinion)? Nothing else. Why then are
you angry with the unhappy woman that she has been bewildered about the
most important things, and is become a viper instead of a human
creature? And why not, if it is possible, rather pity, as we pity the
blind and the lame, so those who are blinded and maimed in the faculties
which are supreme?

Whoever then clearly remembers this, that to man the measure of every
act is the appearance (the opinion), whether the thing appears good or
bad. If good, he is free from blame; if bad, himself suffers the
penalty, for it is impossible that he who is deceived can be one person,
and he who suffers another person--whoever remembers this will not be
angry with any man, will not be vexed at any man, will not revile or
blame any man, nor hate, nor quarrel with any man.

So then all these great and dreadful deeds have this origin, in the
appearance (opinion)? Yes, this origin and no other. The Iliad is
nothing else than appearance and the use of appearances. It appeared to
Alexander to carry off the wife of Menelaus. It appeared to Helene to
follow him. If then it had appeared to Menelaus to feel that it was a
gain to be deprived of such a wife, what would have happened? Not only
would the Iliad have been lost, but the Odyssey also. On so small a
matter then did such great things depend? But what do you mean by such
great things? Wars and civil commotions, and the destruction of many men
and cities. And what great matter is this? Is it nothing? But what great
matter is the death of many oxen, and many sheep, and many nests of
swallows or storks being burnt or destroyed? Are