is, that God is righteous; and of men, he is most like him who is most
righteous. To know this is wisdom; and in comparison of this the wisdom
of the arts or the seeming wisdom of politicians is mean and common. The
unrighteous man is apt to pride himself on his cunning; when others
call him rogue, he says to himself: 'They only mean that I am one who
deserves to live, and not a mere burden of the earth.' But he should
reflect that his ignorance makes his condition worse than if he knew.
For the penalty of injustice is not death or stripes, but the fatal
necessity of becoming more and more unjust. Two patterns of life are set
before him; the one blessed and divine, the other godless and wretched;
and he is growing more and more like the one and unlike the other. He
does not see that if he continues in his cunning, the place of innocence
will not receive him after death. And yet if such a man has the courage
to hear the argument out, he often becomes dissatisfied with himself,
and has no more strength in him than a child.--But we have digressed
enough.

'For my part, Socrates, I like the digressions better than the argument,
because I understand them better.'

To return. When we left off, the Protagoreans and Heracliteans were
maintaining that the ordinances of the State were just, while they
lasted. But no one would maintain that the laws of the State were always
good or expedient, although this may be the intention of them. For
the expedient has to do with the future, about which we are liable to
mistake. Now, would Protagoras maintain that man is the measure not
only of the present and past, but of the future; and that there is no
difference in the judgments of men about the future? Would an untrained
man, for example, be as likely to know when he is going to have a fever,
as the physician who attended him? And if they differ in opinion,
which of them is likely to be right; or are they both right? Is not a
vine-grower a better judge of a vintage which is not yet gathered, or a
cook of a dinner which is in preparation, or Protagoras of the probable
effect of a speech than an ordinary person? The last example speaks 'ad
hominen.' For Protagoras would never have amassed a fortune if every man
could judge of the future for himself. He is, therefore, compelled to
admit that he is a measure; but I, who know nothing, am not equally
convinced that I am. This is one way of refuting him; and he is refuted
also by the authority