point [4] he took me up, observing: So what you now command me
is to teach the art itself of tillage, Socrates?

[4] Keeping the vulg. order of SS. 3-9, which many commentators would
rearrange in various ways. See Breit. ad loc.; Lincke, op. cit. p.
111 foll.

Yes (I replied), for now it looks as if this art were one which made the
wise and skilled possessor of it wealthy, whilst the unskilled, in spite
of all the pains he takes, must live in indigence.

Isch. Now shall you hear, then, [5] Socrates, the generous nature of
this human art. For is it not a proof of something noble in it, that
being of supreme utility, so sweet a craft to exercise, so rich in
beauty, so acceptable alike to gods and men, the art of husbandry may
further fairly claim to be the easiest of all the arts to learn? Noble I
name it! this, at any rate, the epithet we give to animals which, being
beautiful and large and useful, are also gentle towards the race of man.
[6]

[5] Or, "Listen, then, and whilst I recount to you at once the
loving-kindness of this art, to man the friendliest."

[6] Schenkl regards this sentence as an interpolation. For the epithet
{gennaios} applied to the dog see "Cyrop." I. iv. 15, 21;
"Hunting," iv. 7.

Allow me to explain, Ischomachus (I interposed). Up to a certain point
I fully followed what you said. I understand, according to your theory,
how a bailiff must be taught. In other words, I follow your descriptions
both as to how you make him kindly disposed towards yourself; and how,
again, you make him careful, capable of rule, and upright. But at that
point you made the statement that, in order to apply this diligence to
tillage rightly, the careful husbandman must further learn what are the
different things he has to do, and not alone what things he has to do,
but how and when to do them. These are the topics which, in my opinion,
have hitherto been somewhat lightly handled in the argument. Let me make
my meaning clearer by an instance: it is as if you were to tell me that,
in order to be able to take down a speech in writing, [7] or to read a
written statement, a man must know his letters. Of course, if not
stone deaf, I must have garnered that for a certain object knowledge
of letters was important to me, but the bare recognition of the fact,
I fear, would not enable me in any deeper sense to know my letters. So,
too, at present I am easily persuaded that if I am to direct my care
ari