bar and Whitechapel, because the
book happened to be first published there, decide upon the rights of
the inhabitants of those towns, or of any other town or village in the
nation?

Having thus spoken of Juries, I come next to offer a few observations on
the matter contained in the information or prosecution.

The work, Rights of Man, consists of Part the First, and Fart the
Second. The First Part the prosecutor has thought it most proper to let
alone; and from the Second Fart he has selected a few short paragraphs,
making in the whole not quite two pages of the same printing as in the
cheap edition. Those paragraphs relate chiefly to certain facts, such
as the revolution of 1688, and the coming of George the First, commonly
called of the House of Hanover, or the House of Brunswick, or some such
House. The arguments, plans and principles contained in the work, the
prosecutor has not ventured to attack. They are beyond his reach.

The Act which the prosecutor appears to rest most upon for the support
of the prosecution, is the Act intituled, "An Act, declaring the rights
and liberties of the subject, and settling the succession of the crown,"
passed in the first year of William and Mary, and more commonly known by
the name of the "Bill of Rights."

I have called this bill "_A Bill of wrongs and of insult_." My reasons,
and also my proofs, are as follow:

The method and principle which this Bill takes for declaring rights and
liberties, are in direct contradiction to rights and liberties; it is an
assumed attempt to take them wholly from posterity--for the declaration
in the said Bill is as follows:

"The Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, do, in _the name of all
the people_, most humbly and faithfully _submit themselves, their heirs,
and posterity for ever_;" that is, to William and Mary his wife, their
heirs and successors. This is a strange way of declaring rights and
liberties. But the Parliament who made this declaration in the name, and
on the part, of the people, had no authority from them for so doing;
and with respect to _posterity for ever_, they had no right or authority
whatever in the case. It was assumption and usurpation. I have reasoned
very extensively against the principle of this Bill, in the first part
of Rights of Man; the prosecutor has silently admitted that reasoning,
and he now commences a prosecution on the authority of the Bill, after
admitting the reasoning against it.

It is al