.
Officers 10 16 26
Men 80 188 268
-- --- ---
90 204 294

There are no available returns of the Chinese loss. It was certainly much
heavier, perhaps a thousand men. But, thanks to their armour, the two
"battleships" suffered comparatively little loss, notwithstanding the
terrible fire to which they were exposed for hours. The "Ting-yuen" had 14
killed and 20 wounded, the "Chen-yuen" 7 killed and 15 wounded. The two
ships afterwards took part in the defence of Wei-hai-wei, where one was
torpedoed and the other captured by the Japanese.

When the first reports of the Yalu battle reached Europe there was much
exaggerated talk about the value of the protected cruiser. It was even said
by amateur "naval experts" that this type and not the battleship would be
the warship of the future. It is almost needless to say that the battle
conveyed no such lesson. If anything, it rather proved the enormous
resisting power of the armoured ship. If Ting, instead of his two
antiquated coast-defence armour-clads, had had a couple of up-to-date
battleships manned with trained crews, he would certainly have disposed of
a good many of the Japanese cruisers. The Japanese quite realized this, and
proceeded to build a heavily armoured fleet.

The most valuable lesson of the battle was the warning of the danger of
fires lighted by exploding shells. This had an immediate influence on ship
construction, and on the methods adopted by all navies in clearing for
action.

But the most important point of all was that the conduct of the Japanese
officers and men in the battle, and in the subsequent naval operations in
the siege of Wei-hai-wei, made the world realize that a new naval power had
arisen in the Far East.

CHAPTER XIII

SANTIAGO DE CUBA

1898

The United States Navy had taken a decisive part in securing victory for
the Union in the War of Secession. It had effectively blockaded the
Atlantic and Gulf coasts of the Confederacy, captured New Orleans, given
valuable help to the army, in seizing the line of the Mississippi, and by
the combined effect of these operations isolated the Confederate States
from the rest of the world, destroyed their trade, and cut off their
supplies.

One would have expected that the importance of sea-power would have been
fully appreciated in the United States aft