imly, as Erskine gave his orders and the _Ithuriel_ immediately began
to sink.

Castellan was perfectly right in his conjecture as to the purpose of the
Reserve.

The French and German Squadron, which was intended for the last rush
through the remnants of the crippled British fleet, consisted of four
French and three German battleships, old and rather slow, but heavily
armed, and much more than a match for the vessels which had already
passed through the terrible ordeal of battle. In addition there were six
fast second-class cruisers, and about a score of torpedo boats.

With her decks awash and the conning-tower just on a level with the
short, choppy waves, the _Ithuriel_ ran round to the south of the line
at ten knots, as they were anxious not to kick up any fuss in the water,
lest a chance searchlight from the enemy might fall upon them, and lead
to trouble. She got within a mile of the first cruiser unobserved, and
then Erskine gave the order to quicken up. They had noticed that the
wind was rising, and they knew that within half an hour the tide would
be setting southward like a mill-race through the narrow strait.

Their tactics therefore were very simple. Every cruiser and battleship
was rammed in the sternpost; not very hard, but with sufficient force to
crumple up the sternpost, and disable the rudder and the propellers, and
with such precision was this done, that, until the signals of distress
began to flash, the uninjured ships and the nearest of those engaged in
the battle were under the impression that orders had been given for the
Reserve to move south. But this supposition very soon gave place to
panic as ship after ship swung helplessly inshore, impelled by the
ever-strengthening tide towards the sands of Calais and the rocks of
Gris Nez.

Searchlights flashed furiously, but Erskine and Castellan had already
taken the bearings of the remaining ships, and the _Ithuriel_, now ten
feet below the water, and steered solely by compass, struck ship after
ship, till the whole of the Reserve was drifting helplessly to
destruction.

This, as they had both guessed, produced a double effect on the battle.
In the first place it was impossible for the Allies to see their
Reserve, upon which so much might depend, in such a helpless plight, and
the admirals commanding were therefore obliged to detach ships to help
them; and on the other hand, the British were by no means slow to take
advantage of the position. A