we are in hypnotic or anaesthetic coma. With movements of
reflex type we shall have no more concern, since they are almost wholly
physiological, and come scarcely at all within the range of the
consciousness.

INSTINCTIVE ACTS.--Next there are a large number of such acts as closing
the eyes when they are threatened, starting back from danger, crying out
from pain or alarm, frowning and striking when angry. These may roughly
be classed as instinctive, and have already been discussed under that
head. They differ from the former class in that they require some
stimulus to set the act off. We are fully conscious of their
performance, although they are performed without a conscious end in
view. Winking the eyes serves an important purpose, but that is not why
we wink; starting back from danger is a wise thing to do, but we do not
stop to consider this before performing the act.

And so it is with a multitude of reflex and instinctive acts. They are
performed immediately upon receiving an appropriate stimulus, because we
possess an organism calculated to act in a definite way in response to
certain stimuli. There is no need for, and indeed no place for, anything
to come in between the stimulus and the act. The stimulus pulls the
trigger of the ready-set nervous system, and the act follows at once.
Acts of these reflex and instinctive types do not come properly within
the range of volition, hence we will not consider them further.

AUTOMATIC OR SPONTANEOUS ACTS.--Growing out of these reflex and
instinctive acts is a broad field of action which may be called
_automatic_ or _spontaneous_. The distinguishing feature of this type of
action is that all such acts, though performed now largely without
conscious purpose or intent, were at one time purposed acts, performed
with effort; this is to say that they were volitional. Such acts as
writing, or fingering the keyboard of a piano, were once consciously
purposed, volitional acts selected from many random or reflex movements.

The effects of experience and habit are such, however, that soon the
mere presence of pencil and paper, or the sight of the keyboard, is
enough to set one scribbling or playing. Stated differently, certain
objects and situations come to suggest certain characteristic acts or
responses so strongly that the action follows immediately on the heels
of the percept of the object, or the idea of the act. James calls such
action _ideo-motor_. Many illustrations of