ariety of ways, the
most important ones of which may now briefly be described after the
general plan suggested by Professor James:

THE REASONABLE TYPE.--One of the simplest types of decision is that in
which the preponderance of motives is clearly seen to be on one side or
the other, and the only rational thing to do is to decide in accordance
with the weight of evidence. Decisions of this type are called
_reasonable_. If we discover ten reasons why we should pursue a certain
course of action, and only one or two reasons of equal weight why we
should not, then the decision ought not to be hard to make. The points
to watch in this case are (a) that we have really discovered all the
important reasons on both sides of the case, and (b) that our feelings
of personal interest or prejudice have not given some of the motives an
undue weight in our scale of values.

ACCIDENTAL TYPE: EXTERNAL MOTIVES.--It is to be doubted whether as many
of our decisions are made under immediate stress of volition as we
think. We may be hesitating between two sets of motives, unable to
decide between them, when a third factor enters which is not really
related to the question at all, but which finally dictates the decision
nevertheless. For example, we are considering the question whether we
shall go on an excursion or stay at home and complete a piece of work.
The benefits coming from the recreation, and the pleasures of the trip,
are pitted against the expense which must be incurred and the
desirability of having the work done on time. At this point, while as
yet we have been unable to decide, a friend comes along, and we seek to
evade the responsibility of making our own decision by appealing to him,
"You tell me what to do!" How few of us have never said in effect if not
in words, "I will do this or that if you will"! How few have never taken
advantage of a rainy day to stay from church or shirk an undesirable
engagement! How few have not allowed important questions to be decided
by some trivial or accidental factor not really related to the choice in
the least!

This form of decision is _accidental decision_. It does not rest on
motives which are vitally related to the case, but rather on the
accident of external circumstances. The person who habitually makes his
decisions in this way lacks power of will. He does not hold himself to
the question until he has gathered the evidence before him, and then
himself direct his attention to the