the situation such as a definite understanding between
Turkey and Bulgaria, I believe the reinforcements asked for in my No.
234 will eventually enable me to take Kilid Bahr and will assuredly
expedite the decision. I entirely agree that the restricted nature of
the ground I occupy militates against me in success, however much I am
reinforced; that was why in my Nos. M.F. 214 and M.F. 234 I emphasized
the desirability of securing co-operation of new Allied Forces acting on
a second line of operations. I have been very closely considering the
possibility of opening a new line of operations myself, _via_ Enos, if
sufficient reinforcements should be available. The Vice-Admiral,
however, is at present strongly averse to the selection of Enos owing to
the open and unprotected nature of anchorage and to the presence of
enemy submarines. Otherwise Enos offers very favourable prospects, both
strategically and tactically, and is so direct a threat to
Constantinople as to necessitate withdrawal of Turkish troops from the
Peninsula to meet it. Smyrna or even Adramyti which are not open to the
same objections are too far from me, but the effect of entry of a fresh
Ally at either place would inevitably make itself felt before very long
in preventing further massing of the Turkish army against me, and
perhaps even in drawing off troops; a considerable moral and political
effect might also be produced, and all information points to those
districts being denuded of troops.

"With regard to the employment of the reinforcements asked for in my No.
M.F. 234, General Birdwood estimates that four Brigades are necessary to
clear and extend his front sufficiently to prepare a serious move
towards Maidos. I should therefore allocate a corps to the
Australian-New Zealand Army Corps as the other two brigades would be
required to give weight to his advance. The French Force as at present
constituted, and the Naval Division which has been roughly handled,
would be replaced in front of the line by the other corps. This
reinforcement to be exclusive of any help we may receive from Allied
troops operating on a second line of operations so distant as Smyrna.

"With reference to your last paragraph I have no alternative, until Achi
Baba is in my possession, but to keep reinforcements on islands or
elsewhere handy. I have made arrangements at present, however, for one
Infantry Brigade and Engineers of the Lowland Division on the Peninsula,
one Infantry