ly three
separate military forces. The number of small craft required are not in
existence.

_13th June, 1915. Imbros._ The War Office forget every now and then
other things about the coastline above the Narrows. I have replied:

"Your first question as to the fortification of the coast towards
Gallipoli can be satisfactorily answered only by the Navy as naval
aeroplane observation is the only means by which I can find out about
the coast fortifications. From time to time it has been reported that
torpedo tubes have been placed at the mouth of Soghan Dere and at Nagara
Point. These are matters on which I presume Admiral has reported to
Admiralty, but I am telegraphing to him to make sure as he is away
to-day at Mudros. I will ask him to have aeroplane reconnaissance made
regarding the coast fortifications you mention, to see if it can be
ascertained whether your informant's report is correct, but there are
but few aeroplanes and the few we have are constantly required for
spotting for artillery, photographing trenches, and for reconnaissances
of the troops immediately engaged with us."

I am being forced by War Office questions to say rather more than I had
intended about plans. The following cable took me the best part of the
morning. I hope it is too technical to effect a lodgment in the memories
of the gossips:--

"(No. M.F. 328). From General Sir Ian Hamilton to War Office. With
reference to your No. 5441, cipher. From the outset I have fully
realized that the question of cutting off forces defending the Peninsula
lay at the heart of my problem. See my No. M.F. 173, last paragraph, and
paragraphs 2 and 7 of my instructions to General Officer Commanding
Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, of 13th April, before landing. I
still consider, as indicated therein, that the best and most practicable
method of stopping enemy's communications is to push forward to the
south-east from Australian and New Zealand Army Corps.

"The attempt to stop Bulair communications further North than the
Australian and New Zealand Army Corps position would give the Turks too
much room to pass our guns. An advance of little more than two miles in
a south-eastern direction would enable us to command the land
communications between Bulair and Kilid Bahr. This, in turn, would
render Ak Bashi Liman useless to the enemy as a port of disembarkation
for either Chanak or Constantinople. It would enable us, moreover, to
co-operate effectively