be kept, and that no one will grow more dependent by
them than their own interests permit, which make these treaties firm,
durable and permanent!

The extent to which our treaty with Austria is the expression of our
mutual interests was shown at Nikolsburg, and in 1870. Already during
the negotiations of Nikolsburg we were of the opinion that we could
not do for any length of time without Austria in Europe--a strong and
vigorous Austria. In 1870, when the war between ourselves and France
broke out, many sensitive Austrians whom we had hurt were naturally
tempted to make use of this opportunity and to take revenge for 1866.
The thoughtful and far seeing diplomats, however, of the Austrian
cabinet had to ask themselves: "What will be the result? What will be
our position, if today we assist the French, and help them to beat
Prussia, or even Germany?" What would have been the result if France
with the help of Austria had been victorious over us? If Austria had
followed such a policy, she could have had no other aim than to resume
her former position in Germany: for this was really the only thing she
had given up in 1866. There had been no other important conditions,
and the pecuniary ones had been insignificant. Well then, what would
have been the position of Austria as the presiding power in the German
Union, if she had to confess that in alliance with France she had
taken from Germany the left bank of the Rhine, that she had reduced
the south German states to a renewed dependence on France in the shape
of a Rhenish Federation, and had condemned Prussia to an irrevocable
dependence on Russia, subject in future to Russian policies?
Such a position was unacceptable to all Austrian statesmen not
completely blinded by wrath and vengeance. The same is also true with
us in Germany. Imagine Austria struck from the map of Europe. Then we
and Italy would be isolated on the continent, hemmed in between Russia
and France, the two strongest military powers next to Germany, either
continually one against two--and this would be most probable--or
alternately dependent on one or the other. But this will not be the
case. It is impossible to imagine Austria away, for a State like
Austria does not disappear. It is estranged if it is jilted, as was
proposed in the Villafranca negotiations, and will be inclined to
offer the hand to him who, on his part, has been the opponent of an
unreliable friend.

In short, if we wish to avoid being isol